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Do Inflation Targeters Outperform Non-targeters?
Michael J. Dueker and Andreas M. Fischer
updates the empirical evidence from an early
study on inflation targeting by Dueker and Fischer
(1996a) (denoted as D-F hereafter) that sought to
provide an answer to the question: Do inflation
targets impart an aversion to inflation and infla-
tion variability among inflation-targeting countries
above and beyond that displayed by non-inflation-
targeting countries? D-F examined this question
by matching three early adopters of inflation
targets—New Zealand (which adopted an inflation
target in 1990), Canada (1991), and the United
Kingdom (1992)—with three neighboring coun-
tries that did not have formal inflation targets in
the early 1990s—Australia, the United States, and
Germany, respectively. All three inflation targeters
achieved their announced targets ahead of sched-
ule, perhaps in part because the 1990s saw a
marked disinflation throughout the industrialized
world.
Numerous studies have re-examined the
empirical effects of inflation targeting. Many
subsequent studies have followed the formula
laid out in D-F: Match each inflation-targeting
S ince its inception in the early 1990s,inflation targeting has unleashed consid-erable debate on the merits of the newpolicy framework. Its introduction has
raised numerous issues: the difficulty of evaluat-
ing central bank performance in achieving the
target, the effect of inflation targeting on inflation
expectations, the choice of inflation indicators,
links with exchange rate policy, and the interac-
tion between the central bank and the central
government. Analysis of these issues was valuable
not only to decisionmakers and analysts in the
countries where inflation targets were already in
use, but also to those countries contemplating
such a policy. Revisiting the perceived merits of
inflation targeting is especially timely now that
Ben Bernanke, who has a clear academic record
in favor of a quantitative inflation objective, is
the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
Contributions to the policy debate concerning
inflation targeting have come in the form of theo-
retical analysis and empirical evidence. This note
Ten years of empirical studies of inflation targeting have not uncovered clear evidence that monetary
policy that incorporates formal targets imparts better inflation performance. The authors survey
the literature and find that the “no difference” verdict concerning inflation targeting has been
robust to a wide range of countries and methods of analysis, starting with a study by Dueker and
Fischer (1996a). The authors present updated Markov-switching estimates from the original Dueker
and Fischer (1996a) article and show that their early conclusions about inflation targeting among
early adopters have not been overturned with an additional decade of data. These findings to date
do not rule out the possibility, however, that formal inflation targets could prove pivotal if the
global environment of disinflation were to reverse course. (JEL E52, E42, E61)
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country with a neighboring non-inflation-targeting
country and look for differences in their respec-
tive inflation outcomes. Despite permutations of
the empirical technique, the introduction of real
factors, longer historical time series, and a greater
number of countries to study, the initial finding
has not been overturned. In fact, we show that
the basic findings from D-F regarding the timing
of the downward shifts in the policy-implied
baseline rate of inflation are quite robust to an
extension of the sample from 1995 to 2005. For
this reason, we argue that, although inflation
targeting enjoys considerable academic sympa-
thy and the endorsement of many international
organizations, there remains little empirical evi-
dence that an inflation-targeting regime performs
better than a non-inflation-targeting regime in
the same circumstances.
SOME PROBLEMS WITH 
COMPARING TARGETERS WITH
NON-TARGETERS
Before reviewing the subsequent literature, it
is important to understand some of the limitations
of the empirical literature that tries to document
the macroeconomic effects of inflation targeting.
One issue is that, even if a central bank is recog-
nized as an inflation targeter, the dating of the new
policy regime is often contentious. The fact that
the adoption date is arguable says something
indirectly about the clarity of a central bank’s pro-
gram. For example, Bernanke et al. (1999) and
Ball and Sheridan (2004) set Australia’s adoption
date at 1994:Q1, whereas Rasche and Williams
(2005) document an earlier Reserve Bank of
Australia announcement from June 1993.1 Simi-
larly, Sweden and South Africa have presumptive
adoption dates that differ from the date of the first
announced inflation target. Does this mean that
some inflation targeters were targeting inflation
up to two years before the announcement of offi-
cial targets? Getting the date right is important
because many studies are interested in the effect
that the announcement of inflation targeting has
on financial markets and inflation expectations.
If an announcement of an inflation program is
credible, the strongest evidence of its effect on
expectations and financial market variables will
be in the first months after the declaration. Apart
from Vega and Winkelried (2005), there is little
work on the robustness of findings to alternative
adoption dates. Some studies, such as Ball and
Sheridan (2004), Hyvonen (2004), Batini and
Laxton (2005), and Levin, Natalucci, and Piger
(2004), assume a uniform adoption date across
countries.
An issue that the D-F study raises that still has
not been resolved in the discussion of central bank
preferences and inflation targets is endogeneity.
Numerous studies argue that inflation targets are
a commitment device and the establishment of a
target accounts for the observed change in the
central bank’s policy rule. An alternative inter-
pretation is that central bankers, regardless of
whether they are inflation targeters or not, have
grown to take inflation much more seriously today
than in the past and that the announcement of
an inflation target simply affirms this evolution.
The endogeneity criticism was first mentioned
by Alders et al. (1996) and repeated later by
Uhlig (2004) and Gertler (2005) in published
commentaries.
An inherent weakness of the side-by-side
comparisons of inflation targeters and non-
inflation targeters is that conclusions are based
on point estimates. No study provides confidence
bands to test whether one central bank moved
significantly sooner or reduced inflation signifi-
cantly more than another. Against this background,
quantifying the success of inflation targeting using
a scorecard approach based on low mean inflation,
low inflation variability, and low inflation persist-
ence becomes more difficult when the empirical
sample coincides with a global disinflation.
Attempts to remove common trends and common
cycles between targeters and non-targeters are
not undertaken.2 What arises is a beauty contest,
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1 Siklos (1999) sets the date at January 1993 and Johnson (2003) at
March 1993. See also footnote 9 of Almeida and Goodhart (1998).
2 An exception is Lee (1999). He uses a data decomposition proce-
dure, which involves cointegration and canonical correlation
analysis, to remove common trend and cyclical components from
the data used in D-F.
where the performance measures are interpreted
subjectively. One issue concerns the use of a con-
trol group of non-inflation targeters. Studies by
D-F and Groeneveld, Koedijk, and Kool (1998) use
neighboring countries in their bilateral frame-
work to control for regional shocks. Almeida and
Goodhart (1998), Nadal-DeSimone (2001), Siklos
(1999), and Rasche and Williams (2005) instead
focus on successful non-inflation targeters (i.e.,
the Federal Reserve, Bundesbank, or the Swiss
National Bank) in their comparisons. More recent
studies by Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2002) and Vega
and Winkelried (2005) expand the set of non-
inflation targeters but at the expense of lowering
the performance requirement of the non-inflation
targeters.
A further problem in interpreting the results
lies in the classifications of the inflation targeters.
There is little dispute that the initial targeters
such as New Zealand, Canada, Sweden, and the
United Kingdom qualify as inflation targeters.
The inclusion, however, of de facto and not only
de jure inflation targeters raises questions. Finland,
Greece, and Spain are cases in point. It is unclear
how the Exchange Rate Mechanism and other con-
siderations related to their entry to the European
Monetary Union allowed their central banks to
act as independent inflation targeters. In some
cases, it is not clear whether a country, such as
Switzerland, is a de facto inflation targeter. The
Swiss National Bank—a self-declared non-
targeter—appears in many studies as a de facto
inflation targeter after 2000, yet the European
Central Bank (ECB) does not. Although both of
these central banks produce inflation forecasts
and operate with the same definition of price
stability, the ECB is not classified as an inflation
targeter because of its twin-pillar strategy, which
targets the stock of money and the inflation rate.3
The comparative literature on inflation target-
ing has been extended to emerging markets. This
evidence tends to be more favorable than for
industrialized countries. The merits of inflation
targeting in emerging countries are not easily
compared with those in industrialized countries.
Mishkin (2004) highlights issues of preconditions,
a later adoption date, and the frequent use of a
declared exchange rate objective. For these reasons
the studies focusing on emerging markets are not
discussed here. Contributions in this area include
Batini and Laxton (2005), Fraga, Goldfajn, and
Minella (2004), the International Monetary Fund
(2005), Dueker and Fischer (2001), and Jonas and
Mishkin (2005).
TARGETERS VERSUS 
NON-TARGETERS: THE EMPIRICAL
EVIDENCE
Empirical studies on the merits of inflation
targeting document evidence from survey data,
output volatility, inflation persistence, and
changes in central bank reaction functions. We
summarize this evidence below. What emerges
is a mixed picture at best. Although different
measures register an improvement in inflation
performance in the targeting countries, it is diffi-
cult to find evidence that shows inflation-targeting
regimes perform better than neighboring non-
inflation-targeting regimes.
Survey Expectations
In evaluating inflation targeters, a highly rele-
vant consideration is whether the expectations
of market participants concerning inflation rates
have fallen together with recent actual rates.
Survey expectations have been used frequently
as a proxy for inflation expectations.4 Laidler and
Robson (1993) and three different studies in a
volume edited by Leiderman and Svensson
(1995)—Fischer (1995), Svensson (1995), and
Bowen (1995)—found that survey measures of
expected inflation still lagged actual inflation in
Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United
Kingdom after the introduction of inflation targets.
Bernanke et al. (1999) compare actual inflation
with average survey predictions of inflation made
Dueker and Fischer
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3 See Batini and Laxton (2005) and the International Monetary Fund
(2005) for a discussion on this issue.
4 Other studies such as Groenevald et al. (1998) focus on interest
rate and inflation forecasts before and after the introduction of
inflation targets. Their results for the same six countries used in
D-F suggest that inflation targets have not enhanced the credibility
of the targeters.
6 months, 12 months, and 18 months earlier.
They find for New Zealand, Canada, the United
Kingdom, and Sweden that the adjustment was for
the most part gradual. Johnson (2003) extends
the analysis to include Australia and conditions
on the announcement of inflation targets. He
finds that in Australia and Canada inflation tar-
gets reduced expected inflation slowly; in New
Zealand and Sweden there was an immediate
drop; in the United Kingdom no effect is seen.
Survey evidence has been criticized by
McCallum (1998) and others in that they exhibit
various weaknesses including non-homogeneity
across countries and time as well as the inherently
dubious nature of unofficial survey data. Johnson
(2002) addresses these concerns by pooling a panel
of five targeting countries with six non-targeting
countries. His unified framework works with a
homogenous survey, is able to control for measure-
ment problems, and offers a direct test between
targeters and non-targeters. He finds that neither
the variability of expected inflation nor the average
absolute forecast error falls after the announce-
ment of targets when one controls for the level
and variability of past inflation.
Output Volatility
Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2002) ask whether
inflation targeting increases output volatility; they
seek to measure the impact of inflation targeting
on output and inflation for a set of 23 countries,
including 9 that target inflation explicitly. The
hypothesis is that aggregate shocks that move
output and inflation in opposite directions create
a trade-off between output and inflation variabil-
ity.5 Assuming that the central bank’s objective
can be written as a simple quadratic loss function,
Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2002) estimate the real-
ized output and inflation patterns of 23 industrial
and developing economies to infer the degree of
policymakers’ inflation variability aversion. Their
evidence allows them to conclude that both
inflation-targeting and non-inflation-targeting
European countries increased their revealed
aversions to inflation variability during the pre-
European Monetary Union period and experienced
accompanying increases in output variability.
Inflation Persistence
It is well known that inflation dynamics are
heavily influenced by regime changes in monetary
policy. A frequently noted example is that the
level of inflation persistence was lower during
the gold standard. When considering whether
inflation targeting represents a fundamental
change in monetary policy, a question arises:
Did inflation targeting reduce the level of persist-
ence in inflation? The evidence finds that there
is a significant drop in inflation persistence across
countries in the 1990s. Once again, however, the
importance of inflation targets as a determinant
of inflation persistence is mixed when one com-
pares the records of targeters and non-targeters. 
Although D-F do not focus explicitly on infla-
tion persistence in their study, the estimates of
the transition probabilities of the two-state Markov
process for the baseline inflation path (i.e., implicit
inflation target) allow one to make inferences
about inflation’s persistence. Their results show
that for both targeters and non-targeters there is
a high level of persistence in the low- and high-
inflation state. The estimates of the transition
probabilities are above 0.95 in most countries, and
no evidence of a difference in behavior between
the two sets of countries is apparent. This evidence
from the transition probabilities lends further sup-
port to the claim in D-F that there is no substantive
difference between targeters and non-targeters. 
Univariate regressions of inflation are another
way to test for the impact of inflation targeting
on inflation persistence. Siklos (1999) provides
point estimates from an AR(1) model for samples
that roll at two-year intervals since 1968. His
evidence shows that persistence has been lowest
for the United States and that the drop in persist-
ence in the targeting countries follows that of the
United States. Pétursson (2004) and Vega and
Winkelried (2005) use an expanded set of targeters
and confirm Siklos’s (1999) inconclusive findings
based on persistence measures.
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5 Several studies focus on sacrifice ratios. Again the record is mixed.
Almeida and Goodhart (1998) show that the sacrifice ratios
increased in the 1990s for the inflation targeters, whereas Corbo
et al. (2002) find that the average sacrifice ratio for targeters was
lower than for non-targeters in the 1990s.
An alternative approach to measure whether
inflation persistence has fallen is to compute
impulse responses. Ball and Sheridan (2004) com-
pute impulse responses showing the effects of
inflation shocks on future inflation. The results
for CPI inflation show that inflation persistence
has decreased over time. The estimates by Ball
and Sheridan (2004) find that in the pre-targeting
periods, a unit inflation shock in quarter t raises
inflation at t+1 by more than 0.4 percentage points
and this effect dissipates slowly. For the targeting
period, the effect is around 0.2 at t+1 and disap-
pears in three quarters. Because this pattern holds
for both control groups, this result is interpreted
as evidence that targeting does not much affect
inflation behavior. 
“NO DIFFERENCE” THROUGH 
A DECADE OF STUDIES
A common explanation for the “no difference”
result is that inflation targeting represents a con-
vergence to best practices in the conduct of mone-
tary policy. Bernanke et al. (1999) and Mishkin
(2002) suggest that the successful non-inflation
targeters’ strategies for conducting monetary policy
have many of the same characteristics as those
pursued by inflation targeters.6 Both groups focus
on the long-run goal of price stability and stress
transparency, accountability, and flexibility—
the key elements of inflation-targeting regimes.
In a nutshell, inflation targeting is best regarded
as a framework for the conduct of monetary policy
and not as a monetary policy rule. Such an inter-
pretation allays the criticism that econometric
estimates ought to find something unique about
the policy rules of inflation targeters. 
The “no difference” verdict also needs to be
qualified in two ways. First, no empirical study
provides an argument against inflation targeting
or shows that it is harmful. Ball and Sheridan
(2004) suggest that inflation targeting may be
desirable for political rather than economic rea-
sons.7 These benefits are not easily measured.
Second, inflation targeting may improve economic
performance in the future. The economic environ-
ment has been quiet during the past decade, and
thus the true test awaits. No one really knows
what would happen to small inflation-targeting
countries if inflation were to reawaken in one of
the big three (i.e., the United States, the euro area,
or Japan).
UPDATED RESULTS FOR THREE
COUNTRY PAIRS FROM DUEKER
AND FISCHER
D-F8 looked for evidence of a significant
change in a central bank’s reaction function after
the introduction of inflation targeting as evidence
of an increase in the bank’s aversion to inflation.
Here we present updated estimates from their
empirical model to check whether the conclu-
sions, which were based on short spans of inflation
targeting, would have differed from a retrospec-
tive vantage point. D-F used a monetary policy
reaction function that targets inflation in an open
economy while allowing for occasional feedback
from the gap between the exchange rate and its
implicit target. (See McCallum, 1987.) Note that
this is a model of inflation targeting and not
exchange rate pegging, however. The feedback
from the exchange rate is analogous to a monetary
response to an output gap. Like the output gap, the
exchange rate gap is specified such that it will
close eventually regardless of monetary policy.
Any monetary policy response to the exchange
rate is intended only to attenuate the gap and its
consequences. The true nominal target is the infla-
tion rate. We also present results for the case where
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6 Bernanke et al. (1999) emphasize the role of transparency and its
consistency with the principles of a democratic society.
7 Ball and Sheridan (2004) argue that it is an open question whether 
the improvement in the inflation performance of inflation target-
ing countries in the 1990s is largely a function of monetary policy
or of “regression to the mean,” but lean toward the latter view.
Hyvonen (2004) shows historical and regional evidence that is
inconsistent with the “regression to the mean” view.
8 The original paper by Dueker and Fischer (1996a) was first pre-
sented in a CEPR workshop titled “Inflation Targets” held in Milan
in November 1994 and later at a conference titled “Monetary Policy
in a Converging Europe” organized by the De Nederlandsche Bank
NV and the Limburg Institute of Financial Economics of the
University of Limburg in February 1995. The papers and proceed-
ings of the latter conference were published the following year by
Kluwer Academic Publishers.
monetary policy is assumed not to respond to the
exchange rate at all, and the conclusions about
the shifts in trend inflation are quite robust to
this alternative specification.
Neumann and von Hagen (2002) and Corbo,
Landerretche, and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002) perform
a similar cross-country comparison using a Taylor
rule. Both studies show that the weight on the
inflation gap increases after inflation targeting
was introduced. As mentioned in Mishkin (2002),
however, the evidence also says that the central
banks are not doing their job because the long-run
inflation coefficient remains less than unity.
Mishkin (2002) concludes that the Taylor rule
estimates do not allow one to conclude that
inflation-targeting countries have improved mone-
tary policy enough to achieve price stability. We
choose to use an inflation-targeting model where,
if the forecasted relation between the interest rate
instrument and inflation holds, then inflation
will be at its target level every period. In a Taylor
rule, in contrast, the inflation target is only a
long-run target. To show that the target is not
binding in the short run, we note that in his orig-
inal study Taylor (1993) fit the interest rate well
between 1987 and 1993 using a 2 percent long-
run inflation target, even though the average rate
of consumer price inflation was actually twice as
high—4.0 percent—during the same period.
Thus, a Taylor rule lacks a timetable for reaching
the target, a feature that is important to inflation
targeting in practice. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE 
EMPIRICAL MODEL
The central bank reaction function we esti-
mate is closely related to a Taylor rule, but it has
a concrete objective to achieve a (time-varying)
target rate of inflation in the next period. The
time-varying inflation target recognizes that it is
not realistic to expect that the inflation rate will
jump to a long-run desired level below 2 percent
next period if it recently has been running at
more than 4 percent. Our reaction function is an
instrument-target relationship (ITR) rule that takes
a near-term target or “baseline” inflation rate and
uses a minimum-mean-squared-error (MMSE)
forecast of the relationship between the policy
instrument and inflation to derive an implied
quarterly change in the 3-month T-bill interest
rate instrument, i. The MMSE forecast trades off
bias and forecast error variance and takes into
account covariances between components. Thus,
unlike the mathematical expectation, the MMSE
forecast is not a linear operator and cannot be
passed across linear components of the function
being forecast. If the near-term target or “baseline”
inflation rate is denoted pi0t where pi is inflation
and α is given, then a stripped-down version of
our policy rule is 
(1)             
where [∆i + αpi]MMSE(t|t–1) is the MMSE one-step-
ahead forecast. This forecast links the change in
the interest rate to the desired near-term inflation
rate. We can show that our rule is closely related
to the following inflation forecast Taylor rule with
interest rate smoothing:
(2)         
where ie is the long-run equilibrium short-term
nominal interest rate, equal to the inflation target
plus the equilibrium real rate of interest, and pit|t–1
is the forecasted rate of inflation. Equation (2) satis-
fies the Taylor principle provided that ρ + α$ 1.
Note that we have omitted feedback from the
output gap from the Taylor rule in equation (2) in
order to focus on the core relation between equa-
tions (1) and (2) as models of inflation targeting. 
The forecast-based rule of equation (1) and
the Taylor rule of equation (2) are equivalent up
to an approximation: 
(3)  
Examination of equation (3) shows that the cor-
respondence between the two rules is quite
close: When inflation is near the target level, 
(1 – ρ)(ie – it–1) is a reasonable “forecast” of next
period’s change in the interest rate whereby the
interest rate is expected to return gradually to its
long-run mean. 
Despite the similarities, the inflation-targeting
rule has some advantages relative to the Taylor
[ ] ( )( ) .( )∆i i iMMSE t t e t t t+ ≈ − − +− − −αpi ρ αpi1 1 11
i i it t
e
t t t= + − + −− −ρ ρ α pi pi1 1 01( ) ( ),
∆ ∆i it MMSE t t t= + −−[ ] ,( )αpi αpi1 0
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rule. First, it does not assume that policymakers
know the long-run equilibrium real rate of interest.
Second, it does not depend on a stand-alone infla-
tion forecast. Indeed, a controversial feature of
the inflation forecast Taylor rule is the interest
rate assumption that goes into the inflation fore-
cast. The Bank of England, for example, assumes
in its inflation report that the interest rate instru-
ment will remain constant at its current level,
although critics of this approach note that often
the need for further interest rate hikes or cuts is
obvious. Equation (1), in contrast, is based on a
forecast of the relation between inflation and the
interest rate instrument, so no stand-alone infla-
tion forecast appears. The ITR rule’s forecast
allows policy to aim at a specific near-term infla-
tion target in the next period, as inflation-targeting
countries might do in practice. 
The full empirical model from D-F does not
attribute all fluctuations in period-by-period
intended inflation to changes in the baseline
inflation target because the inflation target is
assumed to be subject to Markov switching such
that pi0t is a probability-weighted average of a high
and low rate. A second source of fluctuation in
intended inflation comes from a desire to push
next period’s inflation above or below the trend
rate to respond to exchange rate considerations.
D-F specifically made a modeling choice to leave
out a policy response to the output gap. This
avoids the use of variables that are subject to data
revisions. This way, filtered quantities from the
model represent pieces of information that would
have been available to policymakers in real time.
The data included in the analysis were interest
rates, exchange rates, and consumer prices. Real-
time data sets for output and monetary aggregates
for all six countries are not available as far back
as the 1970s. Moreover, recent results on optimal
policy rules have shown that the response to
output has very small or zero weight in optimal
rules; see Svensson and Woodford (2004) and
Woodford (2004). 
The following equations incorporate these
two potential motives for modifying short-run
intended inflation. Several parameters are assumed
to be subject to discrete changes because, for
example, the central bank chooses to respond only
episodically, if at all, to the exchange rate. We
know that some of the central banks in our sample,
such as Canada and New Zealand, have published
monetary conditions indices that weigh interest
rate and exchange rate movements in tandem to
gauge the stance of monetary policy. In this case,
it is natural to conclude that exchange rate move-
ments at times have influenced the central bank’s
judgment regarding the appropriate interest rate.
Even though the Reserve Bank of Australia
declines to publish a monetary conditions index,
the Deputy Governor, Glenn Stevens, has said,
“I am certainly not saying that we ignore the
exchange rate, far from it….Policy makers must,
and do, form views of the exchange rate as part of
the policy process” (Stevens, 1998). For Germany,
on the other hand, there was concern in 1978
about a sharp appreciation of the Deutsche mark
and in the opposite direction in 1984-85. Great
Britain pegged its exchange rate during its rela-
tively brief entry in the European Monetary System
from 1990 to 1992. Even before that, however,
Britain pursued a managed float in the late 1980s
that shadowed the Deutsche mark (Zurlinden,
1993). Nevertheless, we leave the importance of
the exchange rate as an empirical issue, and we
also present results where this channel of policy
response is shut down, which yields similar con-
clusions about the similarity of inflation behavior
across targeters and non-targeters. The exception
is the United States. We never use a specification
that allows for exchange rate feedback for the
United States. Instead, we allow for feedback
from the term spread between the 3-month T-bill
rate and the 10-year Treasury bond rate because
of the term spread’s record as a forward-looking
cyclical indicator. 
In the D-F model, the trend rate of inflation
can vary across time, especially between the pre-
target era and the post-target era. In equations (4)
through (8), ê is the baseline exchange rate con-
ditional on the values of the Markov state vari-
ables and e˜ is the baseline rate not conditional
on the values of the state variables. We allow for
three state variables subject to Markov switching:
S1 for parameters related to the implicit inflation
objective, S2 for parameters related to exchange-
rate responses (the term spread for the United
Dueker and Fischer
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States), and S3 for switching in the variance. In
equations (7) and (8), Yt denotes available infor-
mation through time t. To implement equation (1)
as a model of policy, we set α = 0.25 and pi0t is
allowed to depend on an unobserved two-state
Markov process. This value of α makes sense if a
25-basis-point drop is the response of inflation
next period to an interest rate hike of 100 basis
points. Other values of α might lead to a better
policy rule, but we needed to make a choice to
calculate MMSE forecasts for equation (1).
Interest rate changes:
(4)          
Time-varying parameter forecast equation: 
(5)     
Baseline exchange rate:
(6)   
Expected baseline:
(7)       
An important feature of the indicator model is
the forecast for [∆i + 0.25pi]t|t–1. The forecasts are
Prob
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generated from a time-varying parameter model
that is estimated by means of the Kalman filter,
as in Dueker and Fischer (1996b). The Kalman
filter generates MMSE forecasts. The random-
walk assumption regarding the β coefficients
suggests that agents need new information (other
than the passage of time) to change their views
about the relationships between variables. Equa-
tion (4) implies that intended inflation (interest
rate changes minus the forecasted change in 
[∆i + 0.25pi]t|t–1) in any given quarter equals the
baseline inflation path 
plus possible adjustments prompted by the gap
between the actual and baseline exchange rates. 
The size of the feedback coefficient, λ(S2t),
determines the rate at which one tries to close the
exchange rate gap through policy actions. A low
feedback coefficient implies that the central bank
prefers gradualism as opposed to rapid adjustment
and return to the target path. Such rebasing of the
targets occurs for values of δ < 1. Consequently,
shifts in the implicit model-implied target
exchange rate are gradually accommodated. As
δ decreases from 1, the rate of accommodation
increases. McCallum (1993) has used a similar
weighting scheme; however, in his model δ
remains constant.
Because of the autoregressive nature of equa-
tion (6), inferences of the state at time t would
depend on the entire history of past realizations
of the state variables if it were not for the collaps-
ing procedure of equation (7). An independence
assumption in equation (8) for the three state vari-
ables reduces the number of parameters needed for
the transition probabilities. Maximum-likelihood
estimates of the parameters are obtained by maxi-
mizing the log of the expected likelihood, as in
Hamilton (1988):
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where the densities are 
(9)   
ESTIMATION RESULTS AND
INTERPRETATION
The central bank reaction function of equa-
tions (3) through (7) is used to find estimates for
policy-implied baseline inflation rates for six
countries: the United States, Australia, Canada,
Germany, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom.
Three countries that did not have formal inflation
targets before 1994—the United States, Germany,
and Australia—were included for purposes of
comparison. The sample frequency is quarterly
for all countries. The interest rate is a 3-month
rate, prices are measured by the consumer price
index, and the exchange rate is the domestic/U.S.
dollar rate except for the United Kingdom, where
ln . ln( ( ))
. exp( ˆ(
, ,L S k
e S
t
i j k
t
t
= − =
−
0 5 2 3
0 5 1
2piσ
= = =i S j S kt t t, ) / ( )).2 3
2 2σ
the pound/mark rate (pound/euro after 1999 in the
updated data) is used. For the United States the
exchange rate is replaced with an interest rate
spread that represents the slope of the yield curve. 
Table 1 presents the updated parameter esti-
mates, with each country’s date range at the bot-
tom. (For Germany, the updated results run only
through 1998:Q4, after which policymaking by
the ECB began.) Parameter estimates without
exchange rate feedback are in Table 2. For two
of the three inflation targeters, the probability of
being in the high-inflation regime when inflation
targets were implemented was very low, as seen
in Table 3. The exception is Canada, which expe-
rienced a period of elevated inflation at the same
time the United States did (around 1990). Our
principal focus is on the graphs of the regime-
switching baseline inflation rates, which are plot-
ted alongside a one-year moving average of each
country’s inflation rate. Gaps between the actual
inflation rate and the model-implied trend rate
Dueker and Fischer
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Table 1
Parameter Estimates with Occasional Exchange Rate Feedback
Parameter New Zealand Australia Canada United States United Kingdom Germany
pi0(S1 = 0) 15.653 (0.311) 6.628 (0.605) 7.729 (0.648) 5.202 (0.311) 15.170 (1.245) 4.786 (0.256)
pi0(S1 = 1) 2.994 (0.116) 1.389 (0.313) 2.589 (0.341) 2.220 (0.154) 2.838 (0.195) 1.697 (0.212)
λ(S2 = 0) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.059 (0.035) 0.016 (0.013) 0.011 (0.003)
λ(S2 = 1) 0.079 (0.008) 0.168 (0.039) 0.000 0.930 (0.133) 0.016 (0.212) 0.043 (0.009)
δ(S2 = 0) 0.507 0.748 (0.105) 0.376 3.508 (1.087) 0.000 (0.011) 0.999
δ(S2 = 1) 0.000 (0.002) 0.414 (0.184) 0.002 (0.073) 0.065 (0.014) 0.002 (0.473) 0.000 (0.013)
σ(S3 = 0) 2.042 (0.342) 2.746 (0.561) 3.737 (1.098) 0.000 2.127 (0.389) 3.206 (0.990)
σ(S3 = 1) 0.012 (0.004) 0.208 (0.043) 0.287 (0.063) 0.000 0.115 (0.023) 0.102 (0.022)
p1 0.978 (0.016) 0.990 (0.012) 0.830 (0.095) 0.920 0.987 (0.012) 0.930 (0.054)
q1 0.875 (0.078) 0.991 (0.011) 0.935 (0.038) 0.970 (0.019) 0.998 0.982 (0.016)
p2 0.934 (0.067) 0.963 (0.030) 0.995 (0.321) 0.990 (0.011) 0.996 0.967 (0.018)
q2 0.564 (0.247) 0.857 (0.109) 0.391 (0.404) 0.975 (0.030) 0.277 0.655 (0.160)
p3 0.874 (0.064) 0.974 (0.020) 0.942 (0.039) 0.664 (0.132) 0.906 (0.062) 0.955 (0.036)
q3 0.962 (0.023) 0.966 (0.027) 0.975 (0.019) 0.867 (0.049) 0.957 (0.024) 0.943 (0.041)
Log-likelihood –197.515 –173.672 –196.360 –128.232 –186.562 –104.386
Sample 1975:Q1– 1976:Q1– 1970:Q1– 1972:Q1– 1972:Q1– 1972:Q1–
2005:Q2 2005:Q3 2005:Q4 2005:Q2 2005:Q3 1998:Q4
NOTE: Standard errors are given in parentheses. If no standard error appears for a coefficient, this implies that the coefficient was set
at a boundary value and not estimated. For the United States, the interest rate spread was used in place of the exchange rate.
can occur for two reasons: (i) a shock has caused
actual inflation to deviate from its trend or (ii)
inflation has moved to a new trend level so
recently that the model’s parameter estimates have
not yet inferred the new trend level. It was espe-
cially important to distinguish between actual
inflation and the model-implied trend rate in the
early 1990s after an oil price shock in 1990.
In Figures 1 through 6,9 panel A is based on
the original estimates from D-F, panel B is based
on updated estimates that allow for exchange rate
feedback, and panel C is based on updated esti-
mates that do not allow for exchange rate feedback. 
New Zealand versus Australia
In 1991, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
adopted a pioneering inflation-targeting mandate,
whereas the Reserve Bank of Australia had a
more nebulous charge to keep inflation at levels
Dueker and Fischer
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Table 2
Parameter Estimates without Exchange Rate Feedback
Parameter New Zealand Australia Canada United States United Kingdom Germany
pi0(S1 = 0) 15.156 (0.947) 6.665 (0.622) 7.729 (0.648) 6.004 (0.441) 15.569 (1.854) 4.251 (0.435)
pi0(S1 = 1) 2.616 (0.467) 1.478 (0.352) 2.589 (0.341) 2.463 (0.199) 2.818 (0.199) 1.449 (0.331)
σ2(S3 = 0) 7.639 (3.738) 3.203 (0.644) 3.737 (1.098) 8.125 (2.419) 2.148 (0.379) 3.051 (0.901)
σ2(S3 = 1) 0.905 (0.158) 0.240 (0.056) 0.287 (0.063) 0.139 (0.026) 0.117 (0.024) 0.156 (0.032)
p1 0.968 (0.043) 0.990 (0.013) 0.830 (0.095) 0.872 (0.072) 0.987 (0.012) 0.934 (0.051)
q1 0.980 (0.017) 0.992 (0.011) 0.935 (0.038) 0.966 (0.021) 0.999 0.980 (0.018)
p3 0.919 (0.060) 0.956 (0.027) 0.942 (0.039) 0.846 (0.089) 0.922 (0.061) 0.946 (0.045)
q3 0.976 (0.022) 0.931 (0.041) 0.975 (0.019) 0.936 (0.038) 0.964 (0.025) 0.935 (0.050)
Log-likelihood –206.770 –178.052 –196.360 –158.249 –187.316 –113.191
Sample 1975:Q1– 1976:Q1– 1970:Q1– 1972:Q1– 1972:Q1– 1972:Q1–
2005:Q2 2005:Q3 2005:Q4 2005:Q2 2005:Q3 1998:Q4
NOTE: Standard errors are given in parentheses. If no standard error appears for a coefficient, this implies that the coefficient was set
at a boundary value and not estimated.
Table 3
Summary of Main Results
Probability of being in 
high-inflation state Feedback 
Annual inflation when Annual inflation when when inflation targets significant for 
S1 = low state S1 = high state were announced exchange rate (S2 = 0)
United States 2.22 5.20 — —
Australia 1.39 6.63 — Yes
Germany 1.70 4.79 — Yes
Canada 2.59 7.73 0.90 No
New Zealand 2.99 15.65 0.01 Yes
United Kingdom 2.84 15.17 0.21 No
9 We thank Kluwer Academic Publishers for granting permission to
reproduce Figures 1a through 6a from the original article in this
updated version.
comparable with those of its major trading part-
ners. The Policy Targets Agreement between the
Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand
and the Minister of Finance defined a precise
target framework for inflation. A time frame,
escape clauses, policy report, and sanctions within
the Reserve Bank Act were clearly specified.
Based on Figures 1A and 2A, D-F concludes
that, in a global environment of low inflation, it
was difficult to say that formal inflation targets
were instrumental in spurring disinflation in New
Zealand and Australia, given that both countries
experienced inflation regime shifts prior to
adopting formal inflation targets. The indicator
model suggests that New Zealand moved to a
regime with a 4 percent inflation trend in about
1988, as seen in Figure 2A. Similarly, Figure 2A
suggests that Australia shifted to a 3 percent infla-
tion trend in 1992. With another decade of data,
Figure 1B modifies the timing and magnitude of
New Zealand’s inflation regime shift to 1989 and
a trend rate of about 3 percent. The updated infer-
ence for Australia in Figure 2B still identifies 1992
as the shift date but finds a trend rate of inflation
of about 2 percent. Figures 2C and 3C do not alter
the inferences regarding the timing and magnitude
of the reductions in trend inflation, in the absence
of exchange rate feedback. None of these updates
runs counter to the interpretation that formal infla-
tion targets served more as an ex post official
stamp than a cause of disinflation. 
Canada versus the United States
D-F note that, although the United States and
Canada have undergone similar disinflationary
cycles, Canadian inflation had usually remained
above that of the United States between the col-
lapse of the Bretton Woods system and 1992. After
the Bank of Canada’s announcement of explicit
inflation targets in February 1991, however,
Canadian inflation dipped below that of the
United States for the first time since 1970 and
remained low. 
A key reason for the Bank of Canada to oppose
an exchange rate peg was that U.S. monetary
policy was viewed to be too growth oriented and
the implicit inflation objective in the United States
of 3 percent was regarded as too high.10 Hence,
one intention of the announcement of a 1 to 3
percent inflation target by 1995 was to signal that
the Bank of Canada had become serious about its
objective of price stability. Indirectly, the Bank
of Canada was also signaling that it wanted to do
better than the United States in terms of inflation
performance. 
Figure 3A from D-F suggests that Canada’s
nascent policy regime was too new to allow the
model to infer a trend inflation rate below 4 per-
cent, although Figure 3A does show a widening
gap between actual inflation and the model-
implied trend after 1992. The updated chart in
Figure 3B, in contrast, highlights how much more
stringently Canada has aimed at 3 percent infla-
tion since 1992 than before. Figures 4A and 4B
give a consistent picture of trend inflation in the
United States: The trend rate went down to about
3 percent circa 1984 and has remained there, with
the possible exception of a short period around
1990. Figures 3C and 4C show that neither
exchange rate feedback (Canada) nor feedback
from the term spread (United States) play an
important role in shaping inferences regarding
either country’s disinflation. In sum, Canada’s
inflation targets appear to have helped match
but not exceed the inflation performance of the
United States, a country without formal inflation
targets. 
United Kingdom versus Germany
The actual and trend inflation paths for the
United Kingdom and Germany, which are depicted
in Figures 5A and 6A, show that British inflation,
which has the higher historical average, has also
been the more volatile. German inflation cycles
tend to be more gradual. The different inflation
records reflect the different targeting strategies of
the two countries. The Bank of England pursued
a policy of monetary targeting during the mid-
1970s to early 1980s. The Bank of England shifted
its emphasis to the exchange rate prior to its entry
into the European Monetary System in 1990,
which it left in 1992. Since then it has followed
a strategy of inflation targeting. As of 1994, the
Dueker and Fischer
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10 See Friedman (1995) for a discussion of inflation targeting in
Canada.
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Baseline Inflation Rate for Germany
Bundesbank, in contrast, had maintained a nom-
inal anchor in the form of monetary targets since
1975. 
As with Canada, it was premature in 1994 to
claim that the United Kingdom’s trend rate of
inflation appeared decisively lower than 5 percent
after the introduction of inflation targets in late
1992, as shown in Figure 5A. With another decade
of data, however, Figure 5B shows that the trend
rate of inflation is estimated to have remained
closer to 3 percent since 1992. Nevertheless this
same trend rate also pertained to most of the 1980s.
Through 1994, D-F note that the estimates
of the trend rate of inflation in Germany closely
matched the Bundesbank’s informal inflation
targets, which were documented in von Hagen
(2005). From 1975 to 1985, the Bank referred to
the informal target as unavoidable inflation and
this varied from year to year. From 1986 through
1998, the Bundesbank pursued a fixed, uncondi-
tional inflation target of 0 to 2 percent. D-F found
in Figure 6A that the trend rate of inflation in
Germany had remained at a level just below 3
percent from 1985 onward, even through the
German reunification. With the additional data,
Figure 6B suggests that Germany’s baseline rate
of inflation was about 1.5 percent after 1985, with
the exception of the period around German reuni-
fication. Moreover, we know that the ECB has
followed in the Bundesbank’s footsteps in terms
of keeping inflation at or below 2 percent in
Europe. Thus, a decade later the United Kingdom
can still be viewed as a follower in terms of carv-
ing a path of low inflation in Europe. Figures 5C
and 6C do not contradict this conclusion, either,
when the effects of any exchange rate feedback
are removed.
CONCLUSION
Dueker and Fischer (1996a) provided the first
comparative empirical analysis between a set of
inflation-targeting countries and neighboring
countries without formal inflation targets. Both
the original study and the updated estimates
presented here suggest that inflation-targeting
countries generally followed a non-inflation-
targeting neighbor in reducing their baseline or
trend inflation rates. We also survey numerous
empirical studies of inflation-targeting countries
from the past decade and find very similar conclu-
sions. Thus, on the heels of a decade of low global
inflation, it has been hard to argue that formal
inflation targets have led to any divergence
between targeters and non-targeters in terms of
inflation performance. 
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